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 COMMENT
Private Defence and Public Defence in the
Criminal Law and in the Law of Tort—
A Comparison
Simon Parsons and Benjamin Andoh*
Keywords Self-defence; Prevention of crime; Honest belief; Reasonable
belief; Reasonable force
On 15 January 1998 James Ashley was shot dead by Police Constable
Christopher Sherwood of the Sussex Police Special Operations Unit
(‘SOU’) during an armed raid by the SOU on Ashley’s home in Hastings.
The armed raid had been authorised by police authorities, and a search
warrant had been obtained. The raid was part of police investigation into
drug trafficking in Hastings and into the stabbing of a man in a bar in
Hastings by an associate of Ashley. At 4.20 am police officers, one of
whom was Sherwood, made a forcible entry into Ashley’s home. Upon
entry Sherwood and another police officer went to the bedroom. Ashley
and his girlfriend had been asleep in the bedroom, but she, having been
woken by the noise of the police entry, had woken him up and he was
out of bed by the time the police entered the bedroom. Ashley was
naked and no light was on. Sherwood entered the bedroom with his
handgun in the ‘aim’ position and his finger on the trigger, and he shot
Ashley dead with a single bullet to the side of the neck. It was not alleged
that Ashley had any weapon in his hand at the time.
Police inquiries into the shooting were started and on 31 March 1999
Sherwood was charged with murder. At his trial on 2 May 2001,
following a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecu-
tion case, Sherwood was, on the direction of Rafferty J, acquitted of
murder and manslaughter. Rafferty J told the jury that ‘there is no
evidence to negative the assertion of self-defence in all the circum-
stances . . .’. Rafferty J’s direction was given on the basis that in a
criminal trial for murder the burden was on the prosecution to prove to
the requisite standard of proof that the defendant did not act in self-
defence. That was the end of the criminal proceedings against PC
Sherwood. This is baffling as it difficult to see how shooting a naked man
without giving him an opportunity to surrender can be a shooting in
self-defence.
The father and son of the deceased brought civil actions as depend-
ants under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 and for the benefit of the
deceased’s estate under s. 1(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provi-
sions) Act 1934 against the Chief Constable of Sussex Police for damages
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for battery, negligence and false imprisonment in respect of the raid.1
The Chief Constable admitted liability in negligence and false imprison-
ment and agreed to pay damages, but resisted the battery claim on the
basis that Sherwood had acted in self-defence and applied for that claim
to be struck out. The judge held that the burden of proving that Sher-
wood had not acted in self-defence lay on the claimants and that, given
the lack of evidence at the criminal trial to disprove Sherwood’s asser-
tion that he acted in self-defence, the claim had no real prospect of
success and was to be struck out. This was reversed in the Court of
Appeal. The Chief Constable appealed to the House of Lords.1 It was held
(by a 3:2 majority) that the appeal would be dismissed. The majority
gave two reasons for the dismissal. First, in criminal law it was enough
if the defendant acted with an honest belief that there was an imminent
danger that he would be attacked even though that belief was unreason-
able. The purpose of the criminal law is to punish criminals and whilst
Sherwood had made a serious mistake, he was not a criminal as he
honestly believed that he was acting in self-defence when he shot
Ashley. Secondly, and in contrast, the function of the civil law of tort is
the protection the claimant’s rights (here, in effect, Ashley’s right not to
be shot by Sherwood), and self-defence is available only if the belief was
both honestly and reasonably held. The House of Lords made it clear
that the same distinction applied to public defence.2 The claimants had
the right to seek a public finding that Ashley had been unlawfully killed
even though this would not add to the quantum of damages.3 This
comment explores this distinction by setting out an overview of the
criminal law on private and public defence. The overview will include a
comparison with the law of tort. Consideration is also given below to
whether the criminal law is moving towards the tort position because of
decisions such as R v Keane4 and whether this move should continue
because of the incorporation of Article 2 of the European Convention on
Human Rights into English domestic law.
Private defence (self-defence)—an overview of the
criminal law
This defence has two tests:
1. The defendant honestly believed that the victim was making an
actual or imminent unlawful assault (of whatever seriousness,
including murder) [or a non-criminal but unlawful attack (where
the attacker is a child or is insane)] on him or her (or another) and
1 Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962.
2 Ibid. at [44].
3 Lord Scott, however, suggested (at [22]) that Ashley’s family might be able to claim
‘vindicatory damages’, which seem to be damages awarded to acknowledge that
Ashley’s right to life had been breached (which is guaranteed by Art. 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and incorporated into domestic law by the
Human Rights Act 1998). Normally, nominal damages have this role, but Lord Scott
appeared to think that an award of vindicatory damages could be more than merely
nominal. Could this be the emergence of a new category of damages?
4 [2010] EWCA Crim 2514, [2011] Crim LR 393.
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that force was necessary in the circumstances ( the subjective test);
and
2. The force was reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be (the objective test).5
Thus, the defendant is to be judged on the facts as he honestly believed
them to be. The reasonableness of the defendant’s response on those
facts is a matter for the jury and not for the defendant.6 The jury can take
into account ‘agony of the moment’ factors, which means that in many
confrontations the defendant will not have an opportunity for hindsight
or debate, but rather will have to act in an instant. If the defendant does
so, but does no more than seems honestly and instinctively to be
necessary, that is itself strong evidence that it was reasonable.7 It is
strong evidence but not conclusive evidence.8 Where the defendant kills
using a reasonable or proportionate amount of force, he will be able to
choose the complete defence of self-defence, whereas if he uses ex-
cessive force, he might be able to use the partial defence of loss of
control.9
However, self-defence is not necessarily precluded by the fact that the
person defending himself was the initial aggressor.10 In that case there is
a requirement that the defendant has a reasonable apprehension that he
was in an immediate danger.11 In these circumstances it is not enough
that the defendant honestly believes he is in danger of suffering injury if
the reason why that danger arises is because the victim is acting in
5 Beckford v R [1988] AC 130 PC; R v Owino [1996] 2 Cr App R 128, CA (Crim Div),
affirmed by s. 76(3) and (4) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
(CJIA 2008). There is the question of whether the defendant’s characteristics can be
taken into account when applying the subjective test. In R v Martin (Anthony)
[2002] 1 Cr App R 27, the Court of Appeal held that psychiatric evidence to help
the jury to comprehend what the defendant honestly believed was inadmissible.
However, the court accepted that evidence of the defendant’s physical
characteristics would be admissible. This must be right as there will be
circumstances (such as a perceived imminent attack by a man) which would not be
seen as threatening to a strong young man, but would do so to a slight young
woman. It is submitted that evidence of the whole person should be admissible, not
just physical characteristics, as they are matters that need to be taken into account
when considering the reasonableness of the force used.
6 The jury is deciding a question of both fact and law and the defendant may think
that the force used was reasonable, but if the jury disagrees, then he has made a
mistake of law, which is not a defence, and he will be guilty.
7 R v Palmer [1971] AC 814, affirmed by CJIA 2008, s.76(7)(b).
8 However, the defendant cannot rely on a mistaken belief about the circumstances
that is attributable to voluntarily induced intoxication: R v O’Grady [1987] QB 995,
CA, affirmed by CJIA 2008, s. 76(5). The subsection also applies to public defence.
It has been argued that CJIA 2008 added nothing to the existing law, see I. Dennis,
‘A Pointless Exercise’ [2008] Crim LR 507.
9 With effect from 4 October 2010, ss 54–56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
abolished the defence of provocation and introduced a new partial defence to
murder involving loss of control. If the defendant succeeds in this defence, he will
be convicted of manslaughter, thereby giving the judge discretion as to sentence.
The upshot is that loss of control has become a defence of excessive self-defence,
thus indirectly reversing R v Clegg [1995] 1 All ER 334, HL.
10 R v Harvey [2009] EWCA Crim 469.
11 R v Keane [2010] EWCA Crim 2514, [2011] Crim LR 393. But note that private
defence is unavailable where the defendant deliberately provokes an attack with
the intention of killing, purportedly in self-defence: R v Browne [1973] NI 96.
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reasonable self-defence. There the defendant should not resist the force
unless he has a reasonable apprehension that it is disproportionate.
Therefore in this situation the criminal law is closer to the tort position
in that the victim’s autonomy becomes paramount.
Public defence—an overview of the criminal law
Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides that:
(1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the
prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of
offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.
(2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the
question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is
justified by that purpose.12
It is a subjective test as to whether the defendant believed that force was
necessary in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in a
lawful arrest, and whether the force used was reasonable is governed by
an objective test.13 Thus, generally, the same tests apply to both private
defence and public defence.14
The tests have been succinctly described as ‘a person may use such
force as is (objectively) reasonable in the circumstances as he (sub-
jectively) believes them to be’.15 These tests were affirmed by the Privy
Council in Shaw v R.16
So, generally, for both private defence and public defence, if the jury
accepts that the defendant held an honest belief and that, in those
mistaken circumstances, his force was reasonable (the prosecution being
unable to dispel a reasonable doubt on both elements), then the defend-
ant was acting lawfully for the purposes of the criminal law so there is no
actus reus and the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.17
There will be cases where common law private defence will overlap
with public defence. If the defendant defends another person from a
murderous attack by the victim, he is acting in private defence, but also
he is trying to prevent a crime. It would be a nonsense to ask the
defendant whether he was acting in private or public defence. There
cannot be two defences governing the same situation, so public defence
should be applicable.18 However, public defence is only available where
12 Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 states a rule both of civil and criminal law.
13 R v Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA.
14 R v Keane [2010] EWCA Crim 2514.
15 R v Owino [1995] Crim LR 743 at 743.
16 [2001] UKPC 26, [2002] 1 Cr App R 10.
17 The defendant remains liable in tort unless his mistake was reasonable. When
discussing murder, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law maintains that private defence
operates to prevent the killing being murder, but if the defendant makes a grossly
negligent mistake, he should be guilty of manslaughter (D. Ormerod, Smith and
Hogan’s Criminal Law, 12th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) 364). But
how can conduct be justified for the purposes of murder, but at the same time be
grossly negligent for the purposes of manslaughter?
18 Ormerod, above n. 17 at 367.
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the defendant uses force in the prevention of a crime.19 If the defendant
is using force against someone who is not capable of committing a crime
(because he is insane or because he is under the age of criminal respons-
ibility), the defendant must rely on private defence, which requires
‘unjust aggression’, i.e. that the victim is committing a crime or at least
an unlawful act, for example, a gun-toting six-year-old.20
Should the same tests apply to private defence and
public defence?
The situations faced by private defenders and public defenders are not
the same. The private defender has no choice to act and no time to think
and as a consequence the criminal law should be more sympathetic to
the dilemma he faces by accepting an honest belief in the need for force.
In contrast, the public defender decides to intervene and makes the
dilemma he faces his own. This seems to point towards requiring a
reasonable belief in the need for force, especially where the intervener is
a public official such as a police officer who is trained to assess the
situation and think before acting. Surely higher standards should be
expected of trained police officers than the homeowner who is facing a
burglar? In addition, public defence is wider than private defence in that
crime may be prevented by recourse to force even where there is no
threat to life or limb such as using force in response to an attack on
property.21 This indicates, in respect of public defence, that the criminal
law should be the same as the law of tort.22 That does lead to the
question whether English criminal law on private defence and public
defence is compliant with Article 2 (right to life)23 of the European
19 Private citizens only have a power of arrest, without warrant, in respect of
indictable offences which limits the number of lawful arrests and the availability of
public defence (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s. 24A). However, police
officers and private citizens have at common law the power to arrest a person who
is committing an actual or an apprehended breach of the peace. Whilst the breach
of the peace is not an offence, the arrest is lawful so public defence applies.
20 In R v Burns [2010] EWCA Crim 1023, [2010] 1 WLR 2694, the appellant, having
agreed to take a prostitute in his car to a secluded area on the understanding that
he would return her to where the journey had started, decided to remove her
forcibly from the car at that secluded area causing her actual bodily harm. The
Court of Appeal upheld his conviction for actual bodily harm holding that the
appellant did not act in private defence or public defence and that self-help or
recaption of property was not justified because the appellant could have regained
exclusive possession of his car by returning the victim to the starting point.
21 M. Watson, ‘Self-Defence, Reasonable Force and the Police’ (1997) 147 NLJ 1593;
J. Rogers ‘Have a Go Heroes’ (2008) 158 NLJ 318.
22 That said, the main reason why English private defence law is open to moral
criticism is that it fails to respect the right to life of the innocent person who is
unreasonably mistaken for an attacker.
23 Article 2 states:
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely
necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
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Convention on Human Rights when these defences are used as a de-
fence to homicide.
Private defence and public defence and Article 2
In cases of homicide the issue is whether English criminal law on private
defence and public defence is inconsistent with Article 2 because judging
the defendant on the facts as he honestly, though unreasonably, be-
lieved them to be violates the victim’s right to life. Article 2(2) allows for
killing where that is absolutely necessary for the exhaustive purposes
listed in that article.24 The question is: ‘Does an honest belief equate with
“absolutely necessary” in Article 2(2)?’ It has been argued that it does
not, and that to comply with Article 2 the defendant acting in private
defence or public defence needs to have a reasonable belief in the need
for fatal force, which is the position in the law of tort.25 Cases decided in
the European Court of Human Rights have concerned the vertical effect
of Article 2 as they involve killings by state officials (police officers and
members of the armed forces),26 but the issue also relates to the use of
fatal force by private citizens (horizontal effect) because Article 2 im-
poses a positive obligation on the UK to ensure that citizens are pro-
tected against its violation.27
In McCann v United Kingdom,28 Andronicou v Cyprus,29 and Bubbins v
United Kingdom,30 the European Court of Human Rights stated that the
belief held by a defendant, who wishes to rely on one of the grounds in
Article 2(2) to justify a killing, must be an honest belief, held for good
reason. This appears to impose an objective test of absolute necessity
which if applied in English law would bring criminal law in line with the
law of tort. However, in R (on the application of Bennett) v HM Coroner for
Inner South London,31 Collins J held that the use of fatal force can be
absolutely necessary where it is reasonable in the circumstances as
honestly perceived by the state official, because an honest but mistaken
belief in the need for such force can provide the ‘good reason’ required
by the European Court.32 Thus, Collins J would not accept the submis-
sion that Article 2(2) demanded that an alternative objective test should
be applied in the case of state officials. So it appears that Williams and
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
24 The UK would violate Art. 2(1) if a state official or a private citizen uses fatal force
for a reason not covered by Art. 2(2)(a)–(c) (above n. 23). Therefore, fatal force
used to protect property or in the prevention of crime (which did not involve
unlawful violence or a lawful arrest) would violate Art. 2(1), but is allowed under
English law.
25 By A. Ashworth in his commentary to Andronicou v Cyprus [1998] Crim LR 823 at
825.
26 McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97; Andronicou v Cyprus (1997) 25 EHRR
491; Bubbins v United Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR 458.
27 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245, Kilic v Turkey (2001) 33 EHRR 58.
28 (1995) 21 EHRR 97.
29 (1997) 25 EHRR 491.
30 (2005) 41 EHRR 458.
31 [2006] EWHC 196 (Admin), [2006] HRLR 22.
32 Ibid. at [25]. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision [2007] EWCA Civ 617.
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Beckford approach is consistent with Article 2(2) and there is no need, on
human rights grounds, for English criminal law to be in line with the law
of tort.
Conclusion
Pace Collins J and the House of Lords in Ashley, it is submitted that the
criminal law relating to public defenders should be in line with the law
of tort because higher standards should be expected of, for example,
trained police officers than of the private defender who is facing a
burglar. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights seems
to demand that, as it does for the private defender who is the initial
aggressor. In both situations the defender makes the dilemma his own to
face and the victim’s right to life should be paramount and that life
should only be taken when it is absolutely necessary, which requires a
reasonable belief in the need for fatal force. Contrast the homeowner or
the small shopkeeper facing a burglar or a robber—in these circum-
stances, the dilemma facing the private defender is not his own, and
absolute necessity is surely satisfied by an honest belief in the need for
fatal force, especially where the private defender acts in the agony of the
moment.33
33 Clause 131 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill currently
before Parliament amends s. 76 of CJIA 2008. The amendments will make the
existing legal position clear that private defenders are not under a duty to retreat
from an attacker when acting in private defence and that they can use reasonable
force to defend themselves and their property. The aim of these changes is that the
law relating to private defence and public defence be clearly set out in one place—
whether they achieve that aim is doubtful as not all the gaps identified by Dennis,
above n. 8, are closed.
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